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Abstract 10 
This paper explores the underlying development outcomes and cumulative emissions trajectories of 11 
20 middle-income countries from Eastern Europe, Latin America, North Africa and South Asia. First, 12 
it assesses their well-being outcomes, defined in terms of access to education, democratic and legal 13 
rights, and the infrastructures that support physical health. Second, it estimates their emissions 14 
trajectories to 2050, taking into account current trends in energy consumption and carbon intensity, 15 
a likely start-date for stringent climate policy arising from the Paris Agreement (2020), and maximum 16 
feasible rates of mitigation. Comparing these estimates to a per capita allocation from the global 17 
carbon budget associated with 2oC, ten countries have low-carbon development trends that will not 18 
exceed their allocation. Of these, Costa Rica and Uruguay are achieving very high well-being 19 
outcomes, while many more are delivering good outcomes in at least two domains of human need. 20 
However, most are seriously deficient in terms of social well-being (education, democratic and legal 21 
rights). These results call into question the socio-economic convergence of developing countries 22 
with industrialised countries; but they also reaffirm the low-emissions cost of extending good 23 
infrastructure access and physical health outcomes to all, demonstrated by the existence of multiple 24 
countries that continue to avoid carbon-intensive development. 25 
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1. Introduction 29 
Is human well-being compatible with climate change mitigation? Recent research would suggest so: 30 
at least a dozen countries have enabled strong health and poverty reduction outcomes, despite very 31 
low levels of energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions  (Lamb et al., 2014; Rao et al., 2014; 32 
Steinberger and Roberts, 2010; Steinberger et al., 2012). However, many nations in South Asia and 33 
Africa still remain below levels of per capita energy consumption necessary for meeting basic human 34 
needs (Lamb and Rao, 2015), including many of the aspirational ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ 35 
(SDGs). Reconciling much needed energy growth in these regions with the newly adopted Paris 36 
Agreement, which calls for global average temperatures to be held “well below 2oC above pre-37 
industrial levels” (UNFCCC, 2015), is a key challenge in the making of climate policy, particularly as 38 
many countries choose to deepen their commitment to carbon-intensive energy sources (Steckel et 39 
al., 2015). Yet surprisingly little is known about historical low-carbon pathways of development. 40 
Which countries enable high levels of access to household energy services, education, nutrition, 41 
health, and democratic rights, at levels of emissions far below the industrial average? This question 42 
is the focus of this paper. 43 
Defining low climate impact is of course problematic, since all emissions must ultimately stabilise at 44 
zero (or be compensated by negative emissions) to avoid exceeding a temperature target. Similarly, 45 
‘high well-being’ is an equally contentious phrase. In this paper, we elaborate on an early definition 46 
of low-carbon development called ‘Goldemberg’s Corner’ (GC): a domain of relatively low per capita 47 
carbon emissions (0 – 3.5 t CO2), but high levels of achievement in life expectancy (>70 years), 48 
comprising about two dozen countries across Eastern Europe, Latin America, North Africa and South 49 
Asia (Steinberger and Roberts, 2010). Our contribution is twofold: First, GC countries are examined 50 
for their ability to deliver a group of essential household energy and social services in addition to 51 
high life expectancy, defined from a human needs perspective, and building on recent literatures 52 
critiquing per capita GDP as a poor indicator of development and well-being (Stiglitz et al., 2009). 53 
Second, since it is the cumulative emissions that matter for climate impact (Meinshausen et al., 54 
2009), this paper estimates emissions trends and peaking dates for GC countries, comparing these to 55 
an allocation from a 2oC global carbon budget to assess the long-term sustainability of their current 56 
development pathways. In short, this paper identifies which countries are attaining objectively 57 
strong outcomes of human well-being, while continuing to demonstrate emissions trends that are 58 
compatible with a 2oC framing of climate change. Accordingly, it argues that such countries may 59 
provide a rich source of climate-efficient development policy for those following in their wake, 60 















This work builds on old and new research investigating well-being in relation to energy consumption 62 
(Mazur and Rosa, 1974; Steinberger and Roberts, 2010), territorial emissions (Costa et al., 2011; 63 
Steinberger and Roberts, 2010) and consumption-based emissions (Lamb et al., 2014; Steinberger et 64 
al., 2012). It is related to research on the links between poverty and greenhouse-gas emissions 65 
(Lamb and Rao, 2015; Pachauri et al., 2013; Rao and Baer, 2012; Rao et al., 2014), a stream of work 66 
known as the "Carbon Intensity of Well-being" (Dietz et al., 2009; Jorgenson, 2014), and much 67 
theoretical and empirical work on the dimensions and determinants of human need (Doyal and 68 
Gough, 1991; Gough, 2015; Sen, 1990). Its closest counterpart is a study by Lamb et al. (2014), which 69 
investigated the underlying drivers of carbon emissions in Goldemberg’s Corner, finding that 70 
countries in this domain of low-emissions and high well-being tend to be diverse in their climates, 71 
levels of trade, and population growth, but are constrained to low and middle incomes. O’Neill 72 
(2015) has also explored countries in the context of their resource consumption, carbon emissions 73 
and social performance; while a cumulative emissions framework has been used in Peters et al. 74 
(2015) to assess the ambition of mitigation pledges in major emitters. 75 
A number of conceptual and empirical advances are made in this paper. To the author’s knowledge, 76 
no previous studies have explored the well-being performance of countries from a cumulative 77 
emissions framework. In this task, this research builds on recently established consumption-based 78 
emissions inventories (Peters et al., 2011), an allocation method to model the persistent short-term 79 
emissions growth of countries (Raupach et al., 2014), and carbon emissions budgets of the latest 80 
IPCC synthesis report (IPCC, 2014). Furthermore, and in contrast to previous work, it follows a 81 
human needs based definition of well-being, moving beyond single-indicator approaches (such as 82 
GDP, life expectancy and the human development index) to suggest multiple indicators and 83 
thresholds of physical and social need that can be explicitly linked to the Sustainable Development 84 
Goals and must be universally enabled to achieve genuine well-being outcomes. 85 
2. Materials and methods 86 
2.1. Country selection 87 
Previous work assessing high-level indicators of human well-being (life expectancy) and 88 
environmental impact (energy consumption, carbon emissions) has demonstrated a non-linear 89 
relationship: well-being increases with energy consumption (and thus emissions) up to a threshold of 90 
approximately 25-50 GJ/capita (~3.5 t CO2/capita), where the relationship decouples (Lamb and Rao, 91 
2015; Steinberger and Roberts, 2010). The countries that lie on the margin between ‘enough’ energy 92 
consumption and ‘too much’ are of course interesting and a likely starting point in the search for 93 















that are sufficient for enabling well-being, but come at a low cost to the climate. Thus the domain 95 
known as Goldemberg’s Corner (below 3.5 t CO2/capita and above 70 years life expectancy) provides 96 
a simple framing that reduces the scope of countries, allowing us to focus in more detail on their 97 
emissions trends and intermediate well-being outcomes. Importantly, emissions accounts in this 98 
paper are defined from a consumption perspective, correcting for transfers embodied in trade that 99 
may mask actual levels of carbon a country could be deemed responsible for (Hertwich and Peters, 100 
2009; Peters et al., 2011), but also acknowledging the closer role consumption emissions have in 101 
enabling well-being outcomes (Steinberger et al., 2012). This framing and choice of data results in a 102 
total of 20 countries, comprising approximately 12% of global population, 7% of global energy 103 
consumption and 5% of global emissions. 104 
2.2. Indicators of human well-being 105 
This paper takes a needs-based approach to defining well-being, most clearly articulated in Doyal & 106 
Gough's (1991) A Theory of Human Need. In this view, well-being is defined as the avoidance of 107 
serious harm, which requires underlying conditions of physical health and personal autonomy (i.e. 108 
the ability to participate, and choose that form of participation in society). This is an objective 109 
approach, but one that recognises there are diverse social and cultural 'satisfiers' for each dimension 110 
of human need (Max-neef, 1991). The human needs approach is related to Sen’s (1990) work on 111 
capabilities, but in contrast is able to elaborate on a specific list of well-being outcomes and the 112 
necessary preconditions for meeting them (see Gough, 2014 for a review). It has substantial 113 
advantages over preference satisfaction (i.e. income), which, among other well-known critiques, 114 
assumes rationality, fails to acknowledge market externalities, and reduces all needs to substitutable 115 
preferences (Stiglitz et al., 2009). 116 
The human needs approach emphasises the non-substitutability of needs, and thus the requirement 117 
that multiple dimensions of well-being should be simultaneously analysed – and not aggregated into 118 
single indicators such as life expectancy or income (an approach also reflected in the Sustainable 119 
Development Goals). Thus even though the countries in Goldemberg’s Corner have already attained 120 
high levels of life expectancy, it is still necessary to assess their achievements in intermediate need 121 
satisfaction, as well as the crucial social and political determinants of personal autonomy, before 122 
they can be judged in terms of overall well-being.  123 
Moving from theory to practice, important constraints are data availability, data quality and policy 124 
relevance (Reinert, 2009). In this paper, three indicators are selected to represent basic conditions 125 
for satisfying physical health outcomes: access to improved sanitation facilities (flushed latrine, 126 















nourishment (a ratio of dietary energy consumption to an intake adequacy rate for the respective 128 
population). All three indicators have clear pathways to improved physical health. Sanitation enables 129 
the avoidance of bacterial and parasitic infections; household electricity access reduces indoor air 130 
pollution and resulting respiratory diseases; while adequate nourishment is a precondition for 131 
human survival, while also strengthening resistance to illnesses (Karekezi et al., 2012; Pachauri and 132 
Spreng, 2004; Wilkinson et al., 2007). By describing the proportion of a population with access to 133 
these needs, these indicators capture distributional issues, but unfortunately provide little 134 
information on the quality (e.g. intermittency) and affordability of each given service - an important 135 
limitation of this study. Respectively, they closely correspond to the United Nations Sustainable 136 
Development Goal (SDG) 2.1 (eradicate hunger and ensure access to adequate nutrition), SDG 6.2 137 
(achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation), and SDG 7.1 (ensure access to energy 138 
services)  139 
Personal autonomy is a more challenging concept to operationalize. Doyal and Gough (1991) 140 
recommend indicators of knowledge acquisition and literacy, but acknowledge the sparse data 141 
available for social opportunities, economic opportunities, and the avoidance of mental distress. 142 
Again, three indicators are selected: secondary school enrolment (as a proportion of the age-143 
relevant population), and the World Governance Indicators (WGI) for 'voice and accountability' and 144 
'rule of law'. These latter two indicators are comprised of multiple subjective sources (e.g. interviews 145 
with households, experts and non-governmental organisations), aggregated into composite 146 
measures ranging from -2.5 (poor performance) to 2.5 (high performance). This type of data departs 147 
from the objective model of well-being, normatively prioritising Western standards of democratic 148 
governance, but are among the few indicators with sufficient global coverage that describe aspects 149 
of personal expression, association and representation (voice and accountability), as well as legal 150 
recourse and safety from violence and crime (rule of law). Of the available international education 151 
data, secondary school enrolment is one of the most comprehensive indicators (but unfortunately 152 
still lacking 6 data points in this country sample). Feasible alternatives, such as literacy rates, or 153 
primary school enrolment are less ambitious measures of educational attainment, but do have 154 
increased coverage. Again, these indicators closely correspond to SDG 4.1 (ensure free, equitable 155 
and quality primary and secondary education), SDG 16.7 (ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory 156 
and representative decision-making at all levels) and SDG 16.3 (promote the rule of law, ensure 157 
equal access to justice for all). 158 
In analysing performance, it is useful to set thresholds, above which a country may be considered 159 
'developed' or high performing. Inevitably, this is a normative process. For instance, the U.N. 160 















quartile on 10 years of data. In this paper, the thresholds are simply set at 90% for improved 162 
sanitation access, household electricity access, and adequate nourishment; and 80% for secondary 163 
school enrolment. In the first three indicators, universal (100%) access is desirable. In fact the 164 
intention of the relevant SDG goals is to achieve full access by 2030 (United Nations General 165 
Assembly, 2015). However, a lower threshold of 90% acknowledges that coverage is growing in 166 
these countries (at 10 year compounded rates averaging 2.6% for sanitation, 1.2% for electricity and 167 
0.9% for nourishment), but that there likely remains systemic barriers to achieving full access in a 168 
sample of middle-income countries which average just 5,000$/capita (whereas those achieving 169 
universal access to sanitation, electricity and nourishment average 36,000$/capita, 21,000$/capita 170 
and 25,000$/capita, respectively). For secondary school enrolment, universal access is not 171 
necessarily desirable, as some individuals may choose to pursue vocational training upon reaching 172 
an appropriate age, thus the 80% threshold reflects a lower bound of OECD (Organisation for 173 
Economic Cooperation and Development) country ranges for this indicator (Switzerland is 174 
approximately 81%). Alternative, more basic indicators, e.g. literacy and primary enrolment, would 175 
again be aligned towards universal access. No thresholds are given for voice and accountability and 176 
rule of law, but for comparison the international median and OECD mean values for these indicators 177 
are reported in the results. 178 
2.3. Estimating emissions trajectories 179 
For the purpose of climate change mitigation, it is the cumulative emissions that determine likely 180 
levels of warming (Meinshausen et al., 2009). From this perspective, emissions must decline and 181 
ultimately reach net zero within an appropriate time-frame, or risk exceeding a fixed global budget 182 
for a given probability of avoiding 2oC. Accordingly, this paper focuses on the cumulative emissions 183 
pathways of countries, predicting future trajectories on the basis of four factors: (1) current levels of 184 
energy consumption and carbon intensity; (2) current rates of growth in energy consumption and 185 
carbon intensity; (3) the start-date of stringent climate mitigation (and thus peaking emissions); and 186 
(4) the likely maximum sustained rate of mitigation (i.e. decline in carbon intensity). 187 
In the first stage, current energy consumption and carbon intensities are given by the start date of 188 
the scenario (2012). Second, the rates of change in these indicators are estimated using a log-log fit 189 
on 10 years of data (2002-2011): 190 
 = exp	 ∙  ↔ log	 =  +  ∙ log		    (1) 191 
Where energy consumption, and carbon intensity (), are estimated for countries (i) in time (t). The 192 
given trends in energy consumption and carbon intensity are then projected to the start date of 193 















2020 is a key date in the Paris Agreement: for submitting updated “Intended Nationally Determined 195 
Contributions” (INDCs), for submitting long-term low-carbon development strategies, and for 196 
enhancing cooperation in finance and technology transfer. Thus, in the following decades (2021-197 
2050), trends in energy consumption continue, but carbon intensities are assumed to decline at a 198 
rate of 1% per year, up to a final sustained rate of 5%; this defines the peak and decline of emissions, 199 
giving a final cumulative budget for each country. 200 
This method presents some drawbacks. It is sensitive to the period in which growth rates are 201 
calculated. For instance, a five year period (2007-2011) would correspond with the global financial 202 
crisis and a likely low point of energy consumption and emissions, leading to very high estimated 203 
growth rates. Consequently a longer time period (10 years) is applied, while the log-log fit uses all 204 
data points to estimate trends and is thus less sensitive to extreme outliers than a simple end-point 205 
approach1. Linear and log-linear forms were also tested, but these resolved poorer fits and do not 206 
allow a direct comparison of growth rates (β) between countries.  207 
A second key assumption is the projection of historical energy consumption trends across a long 208 
period of three decades. This is of course problematic, not taking into account potential technology 209 
developments, rapid social change, or an eventual stabilisation of energy consumption. However, 210 
given recent research on ‘committed’ infrastructures (Davis and Socolow, 2014) as well as known 211 
sources of inertia in technology development (Hanna et al., 2015), it is reasonable to expect short-212 
term growth where this is already occurring (Raupach et al., 2014). Thus the first stage of the 213 
scenario, which projects short-term growth to an emissions peaking date after 2020, is less 214 
problematic than the second stage, which assumes continued linear growth in energy consumption 215 
to 2050, alongside a declining carbon intensity. In effect, no saturation or demand reduction of 216 
energy consumption can occur in this later stage of the scenario, denying an important potential 217 
source of mitigation, albeit one with likely rebound effects (Sorrell, 2015). In this case, it may be 218 
preferable to preferable to model energy consumption as an S-shaped transition (i.e. a logistic 219 
curve), but in fact, since just a few countries in the sample have very high rates of change in energy 220 
consumption, the long linear extrapolation has only a limited impact on the emissions pathways. The 221 
procedure is thus to proceed with a simple log-log projection, rather than a speculative logistic 222 
trend, and note cases where this heavily impacts on the results.  223 
Finally, the assumption of a gradually peaking and then exponentially declining carbon intensity 224 
builds on work by Anderson and Bows (2011) and Raupach et al. (2014), who have argued that 225 
                                                          
1
 In three cases – Armenia, El Salvador and Uruguay – a 20 year growth rate was necessary to avoid either 















energy-system inertia constrains emissions trajectories to a ‘smooth’ peaking effect, rather than 226 
sudden and discontinuous change. The final sustained rate of mitigation (5% per year) is arbitrary, 227 
but a higher value may be considered “implausible” give current and foreseen technologies (Stern, 228 
2007). Such rates of change have never been experienced outside of major economic shocks and 229 
downturns, and never on a consistent year to year basis, but they are in line with similar studies 230 
assessing transition pathways that avoid 2oC. For instance, a similar post-2020 ‘delayed mitigation’ 231 
scenario from the integrated assessment community found rates of change between 3-5%, and as 232 
high as 8% per year across 7 models (Aboumahboub et al., 2014). Indeed, far higher rates of change 233 
(e.g. >10%) would be necessary in the absence of negative emissions technologies (Anderson and 234 
Bows, 2011). 235 
It is important to note that this predictive model of country emissions trajectories diverges from the 236 
INDC framework accepted in the Paris Agreement. Since the INDCs are individual, uncoordinated 237 
pledges, they are not able to achieve a 2oC budget stabilisation (Climate Action Tracker, 2015). 238 
Indeed, pledges based on intensity targets (e.g. China) or baseline reductions (e.g. EU, United States) 239 
cannot be easily rendered into cumulative budgets, as they require projections of GDP growth, or 240 
estimates of uncertain emissions trends between baseline and target years (Peters et al., 2015). The 241 
approach taken here is complementary to the INDCs. It is a parsimonious model based on 242 
transparent assumptions that seeks to resolve the extent to which current patterns of country 243 
emissions and growth will impact on the shared carbon space. In doing so, it acknowledges that 244 
energy-system inertia will constrain pathways to short-term emissions growth, as well as maximum 245 
sustained rates of mitigation, but it remains optimistic that action called for in the Paris Agreement 246 
can proceed after 2020. 247 
2.4. Allocating emissions budgets 248 
Alongside the emissions trajectory estimates, an ‘ideal’ emissions pathway is generated for each GC 249 
country using an allocation from the global carbon budget. This allows for a comparison between the 250 
country trajectories previously described - defined by current growth, as well as an upper limit on 251 
the rate of mitigation – and idealised pathways that ‘fairly’ contribute to the avoidance of 2oC 252 
climate change. 253 
A global budget of 1000 Gt CO2 is used (2011-2100), corresponding to an approximate 66% chance of 254 
avoiding 2oC of climate change, as summarised in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 255 
(IPCC) synthesis report (IPCC, 2014). How to fairly allocate this budget to countries is the focus of 256 















(Baer et al., 2000), this analysis calculates an equal per capita share of cumulative emissions budget 258 
for each country: 259 
 =        (2) 260 
Where the emissions quota (q) for each country (i) is calculated from the proportion of country 261 
population (p) to global population (P) (in 2011), multiplied by the global carbon budget (B). This 262 
quota is then allocated through the 38 years of the scenario using a declining exponential function 263 
described by Raupach et al. (2014), taking into account current emissions growth and ‘peaking’ 264 
effects (Anderson and Bows, 2011): 265 
 = 1 +  + 				exp	− 	     (3) 266 
Where f is the emissions at time t, f0 is the emissions at the start of the scenario, r is the current rate 267 
of change in emissions, and m is an applied mitigation rate to meet the specified quota (Raupach et 268 
al., 2014). 269 
The equal per capita share will generally favour GC countries, as they tend to have lower emissions 270 
than the global average. However it does not take into account historical emissions, suggesting a 271 
role for financial transfers, technology assistance and other means to alleviate the fairness concerns 272 
of developing nations. It should be noted that high emitting nations apportioned with this regime 273 
are unlikely to meet their budgets, even with extremely aggressive rates (>10%) of emissions 274 
reductions (Anderson and Bows, 2011; Raupach et al., 2014), a finding more reflective of the 275 
extreme challenge to meet the 2oC goal in contemporary mitigation scenarios (particularly without 276 
negative emissions) than the deficiencies of a particular allocation regime.  277 
Since the INDC approach of the Paris Agreement has superseded any meaningful assessment and 278 
allocation of cumulative emissions, this per capita approach could be considered politically 279 
intractable. Nonetheless, given that the goal of this paper is to identify existing low-carbon pathways 280 
of development, rather than an ideal policy scenario, it is a straightforward method to assess how 281 
likely countries are to infringe on the shared carbon space. According to their current trends, 282 
countries will either exceed the per capita share, and thus have patterns of consumption and growth 283 
that are decidedly not low-carbon; or they will use less than their fair share and have the 284 
opportunity to avoid carbon intensive development. ‘Low-carbon development’ is consequently a 285 
normative definition, requiring an assumption of fairness, but it is nonetheless grounded in the 286 















2.5. Sources 288 
The data sources are as follows: final energy consumption from the International Energy Agency 289 
(IEA, 2014), consumption-based carbon emissions from Peters et al. (2011), population, life 290 
expectancy, sanitation access, electricity access, secondary school enrolment, voice and 291 
accountability, and rule of law from the World Bank (2015), nourishment from the Food and 292 
Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO, 2014). In the emissions scenarios, population 293 
projections were taken from the United Nations Population Division median fertility scenario (UN, 294 
2015). Due to sparse data, the well-being indicators are reported for the last available year: 2013 for 295 
nourishment (with some earlier data points for 3 countries, noted in the text); 2012 for sanitation, 296 
voice and accountability and rule of law; 2010 for household electricity; and the last available year 297 
for each country across 2008-2013 for secondary school enrolment. 298 
3. Results 299 
3.1. Human well-being performance 300 
The countries in Goldemberg's Corner are highly diverse in terms of underlying well-being outcomes, 301 
as shown in Table 1. The colours correspond to either achieving (green), or failing to achieve (red) 302 
the threshold value for each indicator (90% for sanitation, electricity and nourishment; and 80% for 303 
secondary school enrolment). The majority of countries perform well in terms of electricity access, 304 
with only four failing to exceed the threshold, and nine achieving universal (100%) access. Sanitation 305 
coverage is systematically lower, with just eight countries above the threshold, and only Egypt and 306 
Uruguay achieving near-universal access. In the available data for nourishment and secondary school 307 
enrolment there are ten examples of high performance in the former, but only four in the latter 308 
(Armenia, Egypt, Georgia, Sri Lanka). Thresholds are not reported for voice and accountability, and 309 
rule of law, but it is clear that most countries perform poorly on these measures, with a majority 310 
below the international median (approximately 0 for voice and accountability, and -0.2 for rule of 311 
law). Two exceptions which perform relatively high are Costa Rica and Uruguay, both of which 312 
exceed a level of 1 in voice and accountability and 0.5 in Rule of Law. For comparison, OECD 313 
countries achieve on average 1.1 in the former, and 1.3 in the latter. Since our data is already several 314 
years old, it is probable that some countries close to the thresholds have already crossed them (e.g. 315 
Sri Lanka for electricity, many more in the case of nourishment). 316 
The fact that many countries are able to meet high levels of physical needs access, despite extremely 317 
low emissions, is broadly consistent with other findings; namely that basic energy services do not 318 
entail significant greenhouse gas emissions cost (Chakravarty and Tavoni, 2013; Pachauri, 2014; 319 















minimum levels of consumption (Steinberger and Roberts, 2010). While good performance in a 321 
single well-being indicator could be seen as evidence of decoupling, more impressive would be 322 
performance in multiple indicators. For more than two indicators, 13 countries satisfy this criteria; 323 
for more than three indicators, six countries exceed the thresholds (Albania, Armenia, Costa Rica, 324 
Egypt, Georgia and Uruguay); while only two countries (Armenia, Georgia) satisfy at least four 325 
dimensions of human need. These synergies are expected, as some needs share similar satisfiers 326 
(such as the links between household electricity access and education and literacy), yet very good 327 
performance in one indicator alone does not guarantee success elsewhere. Indonesia, for instance, 328 
has near universal household electricity as well as 90% nourishment, but very poor levels of 329 
improved sanitation access (59%). Sri Lanka has near universal literacy, compulsory primary and 330 
secondary school attendance, and free education up to the completion of a first university degree - 331 
but alongside these achievements, significant issues in terms of food access, as well accountability 332 
and rule of law in the wake of the recent civil war. It is further notable that good levels of services 333 
promoting physical health are generally accompanied by poor standards of personal autonomy 334 
across the sample, showing that these two dimensions of human need do not necessarily co-exist 335 
(although the former may be a pre-condition for the latter). 336 






























Albania 91 100 100   0.0 –0.6 3 
Armenia 91 100 94 89 –0.6 –0.4 4 
Brazil 81 100 94*   0.4 –0.1 2 
Cambodia 37 31 83 38 –1.0 –1.0 0 
Colombia 80 97 87 74 –0.1 –0.4 1 
Costa Rica 94 100 95 73   1.1   0.5 3 
Ecuador 83 97 89 74 –0.3 –1.2 1 
Egypt 96 100 82 –0.8 –0.5 3 
El Salvador 71 94 87 62 –0.1 –0.7 1 
Georgia 93 100 90 80   0.0   0.0 4 
Guatemala 80 79 86 47 –0.4 –1.1 0 
Honduras 80 82 87 –0.5 –1.2 0 
Indonesia 59 96 90 76   0.0 –0.6 2 
Morocco 75 100 95† 56 –0.6 –0.2 2 
Paraguay 80 98 91 65 –0.1 –0.9 2 
Peru 73 91 90 73   0.1 –0.6 2 
Sri Lanka 92 89 75 85 –0.6 –0.1 2 
Tunisia 90 100 –0.2 –0.1 2 















Viet Nam 75 99 87   –1.4 –0.5 1 
 337 
Table 1: Human well-being performance in Goldemberg's Corner 338 
Notes: Data points identified as green exceed the thresholds for ‘high development’ 339 
(90% for sanitation, electricity and nourishment; 80% for secondary school 340 
enrolment). * Data is from 2005; † Data is from 2012; ‡ Data is from 1998. 341 
 342 
3.2. Energy consumption trends 343 
In all countries of this sample, initial levels of final energy consumption are below 50GJ/capita in 344 
2011. These low levels of energy consumption proceed to highly diverging outcomes by the mid-345 
century, due to differences in current rates of growth (Figure 1; Table 2). Countries can be split into 346 
approximately 3 groups: (1) those that remain below 50 GJ/capita, due to extremely modest growth 347 
rates (Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia); (2) 348 
those with rather higher rates of growth, exceeding 50 GJ/capita by 2050 (Albania, Armenia, Costa 349 
Rica, Ecuador, Morocco, Peru and Uruguay); and (3) countries with extremely fast growing energy 350 
consumption, ultimately projected to exceed 100 GJ/capita by 2050 (Brazil, Egypt, Georgia and 351 
Vietnam). 352 















Albania 34 (11) 0,53* 18 (18) 0,11  0,23 0,30 77% 
Armenia 62 (26) 0,25* -31 (11) 0,48* 0,18 0,30 60% 
Brazil 51 (5) 0,94*** 24 (7) 0,56* 22,45 22,32 101% 
Cambodia 37 (37) 0,11  190 (26) 0,78*** 2,36 1,69 140% 
Colombia 3 (8) 0,02  62 (11) 0,81*** 3,40 4,76 71% 
Costa Rica 43 (12) 0,6** -22 (24) 0,1  0,51 0,57 89% 
Ecuador 55 (6) 0,92*** -26 (10) 0,46* 1,68 1,76 95% 
Egypt 76 (11) 0,85*** 14 (10) 0,21  15,63 10,17 154% 
El Salvador 2 (8) 0,01  53 (14) 0,63** 0,32 0,36 89% 
Georgia 68 (9) 0,88*** 87 (36) 0,41* 0,69 0,59 117% 
Guatemala 26 (11) 0,4* -50 (16) 0,56* 0,56 0,80 70% 
Honduras 24 (9) 0,47* -38 (13) 0,52* 0,32 0,50 64% 
Indonesia 14 (3) 0,75** 78 (10) 0,89*** 23,09 27,63 84% 
Morocco 83 (4) 0,98*** -38 (9) 0,71** 2,93 2,96 99% 
Paraguay 4 (8) 0,03  96 (15) 0,84*** 0,45 0,61 74% 
Peru 72 (10) 0,86*** 72 (11) 0,83*** 5,40 3,77 143% 
Sri Lanka 18 (7) 0,48* 21 (11) 0,31  0,75 1,35 56% 















Uruguay 38 (8) 0,54*** 13 (10) 0,1  0,36 0,42 86% 
Viet Nam 105 (4) 0,99*** 67 (19) 0,62** 19,12 11,67 164% 
 353 
Table 2: Regression and budget results 354 
Notes: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 355 
 356 
The trends are thus not uniform, but are largely based on strong fits, with some exceptions: 357 
Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador and Paraguay, all of which exceed p-values of 0.05. These countries 358 
have, not coincidentally, some of the lowest growth rates in the sample and very unstable patterns 359 
of energy consumption in the past decade that are unable to provide a strong basis for projecting 360 
trends. Going forward, these weak projections are noted in the budget calculations. The trajectories 361 
of countries in the 3rd group (above 100 GJ/capita) imply final consumption levels matching those in 362 
present-day OECD countries, with perhaps some uncertainty as to the sources of this large scale 363 
growth in energy demand (although these trends are very robust in the period of the analysis, 2002-364 
2011). Nonetheless, the majority of countries do not exceed these high levels and are instead 365 
projected to reach between 20 – 80 GJ/capita by 2050. Comparing these values to the Global Energy 366 
Assessment “GEA-Supply” scenario, a baseline scenario assuming minimal efficiency improvements, 367 
they are consistent with a range of integrated assessment projections for developing countries (32 – 368 
















Figure 1: Trends and projections of energy consumption (1990-2050) 371 
 372 
3.3. Carbon emissions trends 373 
Carbon intensity trends are more challenging to estimate, with large year to year fluctuations and 374 
generally poorer goodness-of-fits than energy consumption alone (Table 2). The results show a wide 375 
range of growth rates, from extremely high and positive levels of growth (Cambodia) to countries 376 
with negative (i.e. decarbonising) trends (Armenia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and 377 
Morocco). Recalling the scenario design, it should again be noted that carbon intensities are only 378 
projected to 2020, beyond which annual reductions are initiated up to a maximum rate of 5% per 379 
year, consequently, the carbon intensity projections are primarily important for determining peaking 380 
levels of emissions between 2020 and 2030. And since poor statistical fitting (p > 0.05) is generally 381 
associated with low beta values in the projection model (i.e. relatively stable levels of projected 382 
carbon intensity; Table 2), this source of uncertainty should not heavily impact on whether or not 383 















Figure 2 presents the final emissions trajectories (in blue), versus an ideal (equal per capita) 385 
allocation of the global carbon budget (in red). This allows for a simple comparison: if the blue 386 
emissions trajectory for a country tracks below the red ideal trajectory, its current trends are not 387 
likely to exceed the budget; however, if the lines intersect, or the estimated trajectory tracks above 388 
the ideal trajectory, then a country is likely to exceed its 2oC allocation even with the substantial 389 
mitigation actions that are assumed (5% per year from 2020). Similarly, Table 2 details the degree to 390 
which each country remains within or exceeds its budget. Again, three broad categories of countries 391 
can be identified: (1) those with trajectories set to stay within the per capita allocation (Albania, 392 
Armenia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Morocco, 393 
Paraguay, Sri Lanka, Tunisia and Uruguay); (2) those countries who marginally exceed the budget by 394 
up to 10% (Brazil); and (3) those countries who are projected to substantially exceed the budget 395 
beyond 10% (Cambodia, Egypt, Georgia, Peru, Vietnam). 396 
How does energy consumption growth relate to final cumulative emissions? Of the countries that 397 
remain entirely within budget, the majority did not exceed 50 GJ/capita in energy consumption by 398 
the mid-century. Six countries exceeded 50 GJ/capita – Albania, Armenia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 399 
Morocco and Uruguay – and remained within budget, but no countries exceeded 100 GJ/capita and 400 
did so. The conflict between high energy consumption growth and absolute emissions reductions are 401 
clear in specific cases – Egypt, Georgia, Peru and Vietnam – where peaking emissions between 2020-402 
2030 are close to those of the idealised budget, but continued growth thereafter leads to ‘flat tails’ 403 
in the trajectories and an eventual overshoot (Figure 2). Thus in these cases, current growth rates 404 
are commensurable with short-term budget goals (the 2020-2030 peaking emissions), but are 405 
















Figure 2: Trends and projections of carbon emissions (1990-2050) 408 
 409 
Since the emissions in this analysis are accounted from a consumption perspective, CO2 can arise 410 
from both domestic and global activities. Whereas the former is captured by final energy 411 
consumption, and would arise primarily from heating demand, transportation, and domestic-412 
oriented manufacturing; the latter is determined by the average carbon intensity of global 413 
production and the extent to which these countries participate in trade. Thus a strong link between 414 
energy consumption and carbon emissions is expected, but may be nuanced by the particular 415 
economic structure of a country, with a potentially greater impact on those with high levels of trade 416 
and low carbon intensities in relation to the global average (an interesting, but relatively unexplored 417 
topic). Nonetheless, among the countries that exceed the per capita allocation, there are examples 418 
of both open, highly trading economies (Cambodia, Vietnam), relatively more closed ones (Brazil, 419 















With the exception of Brazil, where countries exceeding the per capita allocation, they tend to do so 421 
to a large extent: Cambodia (140%), Egypt (154%), Peru (143%) and Vietnam (164%). Apart from 422 
Cambodia, all of these energy consumption trajectories are based on very strong (p < 0.001) fits, 423 
reflecting consistent and steady trends of growth in the past decade. And of these, Peru and 424 
Vietnam have also shown consistent (p < 0.01) and strong rates of carbon intensity growth in the 425 
same period, leading to high peaking levels of emissions in the scenario. However, in some other 426 
countries the underlying energy and emissions trends have been exceptionally unstable. In 427 
particular, it is debatable whether Colombia, El Salvador and Paraguay are in fact moving towards 428 
low-carbon development, or will continue to fluctuate in their end-use energy patterns. Similarly, 429 
Cambodia and Georgia are projected to have a massive, but statistically weak increase in pre-2020 430 
carbon intensity, which causes these countries to overshoot a peaking level of emissions that would 431 
correspond with the per capita allocation. These problems in estimating growth rates are expected 432 
insofar as the relatively small countries in this sample can be disproportionately affected by sector-433 
specific trends, such as the short-term growth or decline of steel production. Additionally, 434 
consumption-based emissions are more closely driven by socio-economic factors (such as income 435 
and trade) than production-based accounts (Lamb et al., 2014; Teixidó-Figueras et al., 2016), 436 
meaning that economic instability could have a relatively larger impact on carbon intensity change in 437 
this analysis. 438 
Group No. well-being 
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Table 3: Country groups according to well-being achievement and current emissions 440 
trajectories 441 
 442 
Nonetheless, the resulting levels of per capita carbon emissions, between approximately 2-4 t CO2 at 443 
peak emissions (Table 3), fall well within the realm of international experience. In fact only two 444 
countries, Georgia and Vietnam, peak at emissions above 5 t CO2/capita – the approximate world 445 
average in 2011, and far below the range of contemporary consumption-based emissions estimates 446 
for OECD nations, which typically exceed 10 t CO2/capita. Perhaps more surprising is the 447 
predominance of extremely low emissions trajectories. Ten countries are not projected to exceed 448 
even 3t CO2/capita, while many of these – particularly Albania, Armenia and Sri Lanka – have a 449 
substantial portion of emissions budget to spare. 450 
Comparing these results to achievement in well-being, the clear highest performers are Albania, 451 
Armenia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. These countries have low-carbon trajectories which will have a 452 
minimal impact on the shared carbon space, combined with high rates of needs access across three 453 
infrastructural indicators. In addition, Costa Rica and Uruguay have the highest levels of voice and 454 
accountability and rule of law relative to this sample. Other moderate performers are Sri Lanka, 455 
Tunisia, Indonesia and Morocco, all of which are estimated to remain within budget, while delivering 456 
sufficient needs access in at least two indicators. The remaining countries either exceed their 457 
allocated budgets, fail to achieve good outcomes in more than one dimension of human need, or 458 
have energy and emissions trends too unstable to estimate near-term emissions impact. In 459 
summary, a relatively limited number of countries exhibit broad success in development and 460 
emissions terms, with many more deficient in one or more dimensions of human need, while none 461 
are fully satisfying their social needs – defined here as perceived access to democratic institutions 462 















4. Discussion 464 
The countries in this analysis were selected for their low emissions and high life expectancies, 465 
definitions that alone are no guarantee of sustainability. A deeper exploration of their emissions 466 
trajectories reveals striking results: rates of energy and carbon intensity growth are extremely 467 
varied, such that many countries in Goldemberg’s Corner have an opportunity to entirely avoid 468 
carbon-intensive development. The reality of a climate-constrained world means that these 469 
countries will still have to initiate mitigation soon after 2020; but the cumulative emissions 470 
framework is able to assess which patterns of growth can still be reconciled with budget limits, and 471 
thus which countries can be said to have low-emissions pathways.  472 
From a development perspective, it is similarly impressive that these low levels of emissions and 473 
growth have been accompanied by a high degree of access to household energy services and 474 
adequate food supply. However, there is still much room for improvement: in sanitation coverage, 475 
education outcomes and opportunities for democratic and legal recourse. In this sense, life 476 
expectancy appears to be a poor proxy for underlying human needs, masking some serious 477 
deficiencies, such as the extremely low levels of access to sanitation in Cambodia (37%), or 478 
secondary education enrolment in Guatemala (47%). The disaggregation of multiple indicators and 479 
goals of development is consequently an important step towards understanding real outcomes in 480 
such countries – a vindication of the broad SDG approach, but also a challenge to researchers and 481 
policy makers working with fragmented and often absent data. 482 
In terms of energy consumption, emissions and human well-being, Goldemberg’s Corner lies 483 
between the industrialised nations of the OECD, and the low-development countries of the global 484 
South. Is this domain of well-being and emissions impact simply a ‘stage of development’, a 485 
transition area en route to high consumption and well-being? This is a highly relevant question when 486 
it comes to understanding future trends in emissions and well-being progress. Researchers have 487 
offered competing theories. There are those that argue development is a process of convergence, a 488 
systematic progression of poor countries towards industrialisation, high consuming lifestyles and an 489 
increasing dependence on energy consumption – ultimately levelling their emissions impacts with 490 
those of the wealthy world (Jakob et al., 2012; Pretty, 2013). Others argue that development is a 491 
process of divergence, where an international division of labour separates extraction, production 492 
and consumption activities, leading to a static hierarchy of end-use energy levels, large flows of 493 
carbon embodied in trade, and persistent unequal emissions impacts across the world (Arrighi et al., 494 
2003; Hornborg, 2009). Whereas the former view identifies Goldemberg’s Corner as a transition 495 















the latter claims that this is a level of the development hierarchy, where socio-economic conditions 497 
stagnate and consumption-based emissions impacts are unlikely to catch up with those of the global 498 
North. 499 
On the side of convergence, it is notable that several large peripheral countries – Brazil, Egypt, and 500 
Vietnam – have been shown to be undergoing a period of rapid expansion in final energy 501 
consumption. This is occurring alongside an acceleration of carbon intensities in some cases (e.g. 502 
Colombia, Indonesia, Paraguay, Peru, Vietnam), which is consistent with findings that a global 503 
‘renaissance’ of fossil fuel consumption is occurring, particularly in fast growing developing countries 504 
(Steckel et al., 2015). Similarly, high levels of infrastructure access across many countries in 505 
Goldemberg’s Corner, along with consistent (linear) rates of improvement in these indicators 506 
demonstrated elsewhere (Lamb and Rao, 2015), tend to suggest that development outcomes, at 507 
least in terms of physical health, are ‘catching-up’ with the universal access levels of the 508 
industrialised world. 509 
On the other hand, there are evident discontinuities in supposed patterns of convergence. Many 510 
countries in Goldemberg’s Corner are in an effective steady state of energy consumption, with 511 
growth that will still not exceed 50GJ/capita by 2050. Of these, a number of countries have 512 
experienced substantial shocks and declines in energy supply over the past decades (particularly 513 
Colombia, El Salvador, Paraguay and Georgia), while trends in carbon intensity have also declined for 514 
some (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Morocco). In the literature emphasising 515 
divergence, particularly world-systems theory, considerable weight is given to class relations, and 516 
asymmetries of trade, finance and military power as key barriers to socio-economic development 517 
(Roberts and Parks, 2009). It is therefore notable that the majority of countries in Goldemberg’s 518 
Corner remain challenged in their social and political well-being, and indeed that some of the 519 
slowest rates of energy consumption growth, and poorest development outcomes, can be found in 520 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador – all of which have historically succumbed to foreign military 521 
intervention or sponsored suppressions of civil liberties (Chomsky, 1985). That Costa Rica is an 522 
exception in this regard, with both high physical and social need satisfaction, speaks to the 523 
importance of a strong social democratic state in withstanding international market forces and 524 
pursuing human development progress on the periphery (Sandbrook et al., 2007). 525 
The evidence of this study leans towards divergence. Rather than following a modernizing pathway 526 
of economic growth, structural change and democratisation, the countries in Goldemberg’s Corner 527 
have diverse patterns of growth and stabilisation, as well as persistent social and political challenges, 528 















North. This is not to say that high energy consumption (and thus high income) equates with high 530 
well-being; evidently these countries are on a threshold of decoupling between the two, certainly in 531 
the ‘bare necessities’ that constitute the physical need indicators. The question is whether high 532 
standards of social well-being (i.e. democratisation) are universally attainable given the current 533 
structure of the world economy, which in recent decades has shown tendencies of widespread social 534 
and political dislocation in the periphery (Arrighi et al., 2003) – thus highlighting the enormous 535 
challenge of enabling human well-being within the systematic inequalities of capitalism, as well as 536 
the physical constraints of a 2oC carbon budget. 537 
This work has several limitations. In the first instance, it has explored high level trends only, rather 538 
than the underlying determinants of energy-system change in Goldemberg’s Corner. Yet given the 539 
general lack of studies on country development pathways (particularly from a climate and 540 
development perspective), this is a useful first step and has identified specific states that are be 541 
worthy of further attention. For example, those countries that have experienced rapid energy 542 
consumption and carbon intensity growth over the past decade (Egypt, Peru, Vietnam) will be highly 543 
relevant to the widely discussed issue of ‘technological lock-in’ (Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006) 544 
and the role of investment cycles and durable assets in determining future emissions growth (Davis 545 
and Socolow, 2014). Equally, in cases where well-being is proceeding with little cumulative emissions 546 
cost (e.g. Armenia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Sri Lanka, Tunisia), questions are raised as to the social and 547 
political determinants of low-carbon development, with relevance for on-going claims of a ‘climate-548 
development conflict’. A further limitation of this study is the absence of non-CO2 greenhouse gas 549 
emissions in country trajectories, which are known to be systematically higher in developing 550 
countries (Smith et al., 2013). This is a constraint of the cumulative emissions approach, in which 551 
short-lived greenhouse gasses cannot be easily incorporated in long-term warming estimates. 552 
Indeed there may be important trade-offs between low-emissions pathways and other types of 553 
environmental load (e.g. ecosystem degradation) whose mitigation will be critical to the long-term 554 
sustainability of human well-being. 555 
5. Conclusions 556 
This article assesses emissions trajectories and development outcomes in a group of 20 low to 557 
middle-income countries (Goldemberg’s Corner). It has elaborated on a definition of low-carbon 558 
development, based on a cumulative emissions framework and a human needs perspective on well-559 
being. Given assumptions of stringent post-2020 climate policy and a maximum sustained mitigation 560 
rate of 5% per year, it finds that at least 11 countries in Goldemberg’s Corner (Albania, Armenia, 561 















have consistent trajectories that will not exceed an equal per capita allocation of the global carbon 563 
budget (or: ‘low-carbon’ trajectories that will not infringe more than proportionally on the shared 564 
carbon space). The remaining countries exceed this normative boundary by various degrees, or have 565 
trends that are too unstable to reliably estimate current growth. In Cambodia, Brazil, Egypt, Georgia, 566 
Peru, and Vietnam, recent trends in energy consumption and carbon intensity growth will need to be 567 
curtailed in order to avoid high-carbon development pathways, as remaining below 100GJ/capita has 568 
been shown to be pre-requisite to meeting a fair emissions budget allocation. 569 
Considering underlying well-being outcomes, this study confirms previous work demonstrating the 570 
decoupling of human well-being from environmental impact, finding that as of 2011 high levels of 571 
human need satisfaction are present in countries with low levels of energy consumption (<50 572 
GJ/capita) and emissions (<3.5 t CO2/capita). That several of these high performing countries 573 
(Albania, Armenia, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia) also have growth rates that are 574 
commensurate with a cumulative emissions definition of low-carbon development is even more 575 
impressive. These results are in stark contrast to the carbon intensive pathways followed by most 576 
nations in the global North, as well as recently emerging countries such as China, most of which 577 
would be unable to meet their emissions budgets under the same allocation scheme (Raupach et al., 578 
2014). Nonetheless, Goldemberg’s Corner is a domain of poor social need satisfaction, with 579 
unresolved issues of crime, representation and democratic accountability. And given their diversity 580 
of energy consumption and carbon intensity trends, from growth to steady-state or decline, it is 581 
questionable whether these countries are converging in emissions with the wealthy and 582 
industrialised world. If pathways of development are not converging, then Goldenberg’s Corner may 583 
represent a position in the international development hierarchy, where countries are able to satisfy 584 
a basic floor of health, energy and household services, but are otherwise trapped in stagnating socio-585 
economic conditions. 586 
This study raises many potential areas of research. The scope of countries could be extended 587 
further, to identify good well-being and emissions performance at different levels of development. 588 
This may be complimentary to both the Sustainable Development Goals and the INDCs of the Paris 589 
Agreement – political goals that are clearly interlinked, but have yet to be investigated in a 590 
systematic way for trade-offs and synergies. To build on the examples of low-carbon development 591 
identified in this analysis, a next step is to identify their underlying systems of need provision, i.e. 592 
their social welfare regimes, physical infrastructures, and consumption of goods and services. This is 593 
a challenge for the research community, which currently lacks theoretical work linking human well-594 
being, physical resources and energy consumption. Nonetheless, the outcomes demonstrated here – 595 















underline the powerful role a well-being frame may have in climate policy; from demonstrating the 597 
existence of low-carbon development pathways, to highlighting the excessive levels of energy 598 
consumption in wealthy countries, far beyond what is necessary for satisfying human needs. 599 
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• 20 middle income countries are assessed on development performance and 
emissions 
• 8 are found to have low-carbon trajectories but high human need satisfaction 
• Climate-development policy can learn from efficient historical pathways 
• Climate policy following 2020 is required to avoid locking-in high carbon 
pathways 
